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Access control systems are deployed in organizations to pro-
tect critical cyber-physical assets. These systems need to
be adjustable to cope with different contextual factors like
changes in resources or requirements. Still, adaptation is
often performed manually. In addition, different product
variants of access control systems need to developed to-
gether systematically. These characteristics demand a prod-
uct line engineering approach for enhanced reuse. More-
over, to cope with uncertainty at runtime, adaptivity, i.e.,
switching between variations in a cyber-physical domain (re-
configuration) and adjusting access policies (behavior adap-
tation), needs to be supported.
In this position paper, we sketch an approach for engineer-
ing dynamic access control systems based on core concepts
from dynamic software product lines and executable run-
time models. The proposed solution is presented and first
experiences are discussed along a sample dynamic software
product line in the role-based access control domain.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
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Access control systems, adaptive software, dynamic software
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1. INTRODUCTION
Access Control Systems (ACSs) can support security in
physical, cyber or cyber-physical domains. No matter what
approach is followed for realizing access control (role-based,
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attribute-based, etc.) in practice, especially in physical ac-
cess control systems, managing changes is normally per-
formed manually. Changes to access control policies are
required though, e.g., to consider new employees, visitors
with special needs, or varying business processes. Hence,
Dynamic Access Control Systems (DACSs) are needed that
can adjust themselves quickly to suit emerging situations.
Generally, we noticed that adaptive security and self-pro-
tection have not been widely addressed in the adaptive soft-
ware community [8] and the access control domain is not an
exception. Particularly, we are not aware of a solution that
specifically combines Software Product Line (SPL) technol-
ogy [7] and runtime adaptation in this domain. Since access
control systems can be available in different variants depend-
ing on the needed security features, following the SPL ap-
proach seems natural, though. Furthermore, once a DACS
was deployed, it needs to stay continuously and actively in
place. Therefore, it is desirable to develop security systems
that adapt themselves during operation.
In this position paper, we propose to follow a Dynamic
Software Product Line (DSPL) [3] approach for realizing
adaptive security. We believe DAC is an appealing sample
domain for adaptation and DSPLs, because variants need
to be switched (reconfiguration) and access policies are re-
quired to be adjusted (behaviour adaptation) at runtime.
We scope the problem domain to physical access control in
this paper and we consider the well-known Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) model [2]. Our main contributions
are (i) to discuss the potential application of DSPLs in the
dynamic access control domain and (ii) to sketch a flexi-
ble model-centric solution following our previous work [1] on
engineering adaptive software that leverages query/transfor-
m/interpret operations on graph-based runtime models.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Imagine a software company builds and maintains a prod-
uct line of cyber-physical access control systems. Variabil-
ity in the domain is captured using feature models [4] and
a product variant is described by a configuration, i.e., by a
selected set of features. Hence, a product line is represented
by a feature model covering physical (e.g., access to build-
ings), cyber (e.g., access to file systems), and cyber-physical
access control systems (e.g., access to physical and informa-
tion assets in a company) with varying sensors and security
control mechanisms.
This sample product line consists of two mutual exclu-
sive access control models: Access Control List (ACL) and
RBAC. Depending on the resources to be protected, con-
Figure 1: Sample Product Feature Configuration
trol actions and monitoring features can be selected. For a
physical access control product variant, card reader and lock
control as well as the tracking of people, physical or cyber
resources can be chosen.
Subsequently, we assume a product is configured as shown
in Figure 1. The illustrated excerpt does not include varia-
tion points and variations in implementing assets. The de-
rived product variant is deployed in an environment with
roles and rooms as described in Listing 1.
1 Roles = {Manager, Engineer, Admin Staff, IT staff,
2 Guest, VIP}
3 Rooms = {Manager Room (R1), Main Office (R2),
4 IT Room (R3), Engineering Rooms (R4,R5,R6),
5 Seminar Room (R7)}
Listing 1: Physical Setting of Deployed Product
Moreover, the initial set of access control policies is for-
mulated as given in Listing 2 to secure the building under
the typical conditions assumed at the time of deployment.
1 IF role = "Manager" THEN grantAccess(R1,R7)
2 IF role = "Engineer" THEN grantAccess(R4,R5,R6,R7)
3 IF role = "Admin Staff" THEN grantAccess(R2,R1)
4 IF role = "IT Staff" THEN grantAccess(R3,R7)
5 IF role = "Guest" THEN grantAccess(R7)
Listing 2: Initial Set of Access Control Policies
Given this setup, imagine a VIP plans to visit the organi-
zation to participate in a seminar and to have a meeting with
the manager. To protect the VIP, the adaption strategy is to
revoke access permissions from specific roles such that only
managers can be with the VIP in the same room. Addition-
ally, existing business processes shall not be compromised,
i.e., pre-booking and occupying rooms for the VIP is not an
option, even though the person is not in that room. It is
desired to adjust access control policies dynamically.
Adaptation strategies shall be implemented for the whole
product line and shall be shipped with each product variant
so it can react during operation. In the rest of this paper,
we describe how a DSPL-based and model-centric approach
can support the engineering of such a dynamic access control
product line.
3. ARCHITECTURE
The dynamic access control system follows an architec-
tural blueprint that we originally designed for adaptive soft-
ware systems and which we implemented prototypically as
the Graph-based Runtime Adaptation Framework (GRAF) [1].
To achieve adaptivity, this Java framework uses executable
models at runtime and related techniques (especially: query-
ing, transforming, and interpreting) as well as basic mecha-
nisms from aspect-oriented-programming.
Subsequently, the core aspects of this solution concept,
and its application in the context of DSPLs, are introduced
via a structural and behavioral view.
3.1 Structural View
As sketched in Figure 2, we follow a layered architecture.
Included components, repositories, and their roles are briefly
introduced here as well as three essential interfaces. Note,
that in a full-scale implementation, the presented architec-
ture would be developed and used by two processes, i.e., by
domain engineering and application engineering [7].
Access Control Core Functionality Layer. The low-
est layer contains the product line’s artifacts with core func-
tionality, e.g., for granting and rejecting access to rooms
as well as for reading data from RFID chips as needed for
location monitoring. In general, performance critical func-
tionality as well as driver software are located here.
Artifacts in this layer can expose sensed context changes
(StateVar), e.g., data from tracking asset positions. More-
over, at predefined variation points in the artifacts, the con-
trol flow can be redirected to upper layers (Interpreta-
tionPoint) and a variation of functionality may be executed
(Action) as described by models. The roles of these inter-
faces are described in Section 3.2.
Middleware Layer. Two model interpreters play a cen-
tral role in this architecture. Both use the Action interface
to call existing functionality or to change the state of ar-
tifacts and contained elements: The access control model
interpreter executes the access control model by calling im-
plemented behavior variations. The configuration model in-
terpreter is invoked on changes to the configuration model
and it enables/disables sensors in the assets or loads compo-
nents that were not deployed but are needed to implement
a new configuration of features.
L3: Adaptation Management Layer
L2: Runtime Model Layer
L1: Middleware Layer
L0: Access Control Core Functionality Layer
Rule Engine, Adaptation Rules
Model Manager, Integrated Model Schema & Constraints, Configuration Model, 
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Figure 2: Layered Model-Centric Architecture
for Dynamic Access Control Software (Following
GRAF [1])
Runtime Model Layer. The product’s runtime model [5]
is interpreted during operation and conforms to the runtime
model schema (metamodel) that is illustrated in Figure 3. It
consists of three parts: (i) an access control model that en-
codes access control policies such as those illustrated in List-
ing 2, (ii) the configuration model that captures variability
in features and implementing program elements (variables,
methods) and (iii) a state variables model that represent the
sensed subset of a product’s context.
The runtime model schema for a specific product line is
designed and developed during domain engineering. Then,
an initial instance of the runtime model is created during ap-
plication engineering and before product deployment. Main-
taining the full schema and one concrete model instance, as
an integrated part of each product at runtime, is at the heart
of our approach to DSPLs.
Adaptation Management Layer. Given this setup,
the product’s behavior can be changed dynamically by ad-
justing the access control model during operation. This
adaptation can be performed either (i) autonomously based
on predefined adaptation rules and a generic rule engine as
presented here, and (ii) manually, e.g., via a user interface or
by calling the provided model-manipulation API. Designing
and implementing adaptation rules are part of the product-
line’s domain engineering process. The full implementation
of this architecture is ongoing work.
3.2 Behavioral View
The runtime behavior of a DACS, developed according
to our approach, is strongly determined by the state and
knowledge that is represented in the runtime model. When
conditions in the environment change that can be sensed, the
values of state variables embedded in the core functionality
layer are propagated to the runtime model via the middle-
ware layer’s state variable adapter components. In effect,
the runtime model is changed, i.e., it now contains the fresh
sensor data, and the rule engine gets notified via the model
manager. Additionally, model changes can be triggered by
human administrators (not presented here) who manually
feed new environment data into the state variables, add new
roles, rooms or change the selection of features.
In reaction to a model change event, the rule engine com-
ponent in the adaptation management layer plans appropri-
ate steps using the set of available adaptation rules. Adap-
tation rules are Event Condition Action (ECA) rules where
(i) the event event is usually a model change event, (ii) the
condition is realized as a model query and (iii) the action
Figure 3: Excerpt of Runtime Model Schema (Visu-
alized in Concrete Syntax of UML Class Diagrams)
is represented by a model transformation that is sent to the
model manager for execution. A transformation of the run-
time model results in an adapted behavior or configuration
state of the DACS as described subsequently.
Adaptation of Access Control Policies. The respon-
sible model interpreter is invoked at an interpretation point
in the core functionality layer, e.g., when a user requests
access and the respective code is executed. Then, the inter-
preter walks along a path from the user’s role to the room’s
representation in the model and executes the behavior as-
sociated with the Action node. In this example, the associ-
ated BehaviorVariation can point to one of two methods:
grantAccess() or denyAccess() by their declaringEle-
mentId (e.g., a fully qualified method name).
Adaptation of Configuration. In case that the con-
figuration model changed, the responsible model interpreter
can activate and deactivate variations, e.g., sensor variables.
The activation state of all available program elements (that
represent a variation) is synchronized between the runtime
model and the implementing artifacts. To support adapta-
tion, the configuration model captures the generally avail-
able variations in product line artifacts, even if they were
not deployed in the given product variant.
In the subsequent section, we describe the application of
this architecture along the introduced motivating example.
4. APPLICATION SCENARIO
In this section, we describe how the DACS reacts in one
specific application scenario as partially introduced in Sec-
tion 2. The hypothetical customer buys a subset of the prod-
uct line that initially covers the features selected in Figure 1.
In addition, adaptation rules are shipped with the product
such that its capabilities can be adjusted automatically to
(foreseen) context changes. The configuration model rep-
resents the initial feature selection and the access control
model encodes the initial access control policies.
At some point, a VIP visits the company, which is an
exceptional event from the customer’s perspective. The new
requirement is now to ensure that only managers can be in
the same room as the VIP. To satisfy this goal, a location-
based approach shall be applied where the VIP’s location
is continuously tracked. This feature was foreseen in the
product line, i.e., in terms of the Monitoring features, but
none of them was selected during initial shipping to respect
privacy concerns of the organization’s regular staff.
We assume that the VIP is given a card or gadget to be
identified by the access control system. After detecting the
VIP user in the system boundary, the user will be added, and
the selection state of the PeopleLocationTracking feature
is set to true in the configuration model part of the runtime
model. All these modifications are done during operation of
the DACS and at the model-level.
In result of the changed configuration, a state variable
needs to be activated to provide the VIP’s location infor-
mation, e.g., via RFID, assuming the VIP is carrying an
RFID-enabled card. In this sample scenario, each DataVari-
ation in the runtime model has an enabled flag. Since the
LocationStateVariable is required for implementing the
PersonTrackingFeature, it must be activated. The config-
uration model interpreter enables the sensor via the Action
interface once the feature selection changed. Whenever the
VIP enters a new room, his location information is updated
in the runtime model.
Afterwards, the rule engine is invoked and can react, e.g.,
by choosing the adaptation rule sketched in Listing 3, to
update the access control policies represented by the access
control model.
1 ON (VIPRoleIntroducedEvent)
2 IF (isSelected(PersonTrackingFeature) AND
3 exists(User.role == "VIP") AND
4 User.location != ModelHistory.getPrev(User.location))
5 DO {
6 // Revoke access from all users to room, except for managers
7 // Action->behaviorVariation.declaringElementID="denyAccess"
8 )
Listing 3: Adaptation Rule for Updating the Access
Control Model (Pseudocode)
The next time a person attempts to enter any room, e.g.,
using an access chip-card, the control flow in the access con-
trol assets reaches the interpretation point. The model in-
terpreter searches for a path between the User and the cor-
responding Room nodes in the runtime model and executes
the Action node’s associated BehaviorVariation to grant
or deny access, e.g., by calling methods in the core function-
ality layer using Java’s reflection mechanism.
5. RELATEDWORK AND CONCLUSIONS
In this position paper, we presented one possible way to
achieve reuse and to deal with dynamically changing cus-
tomer requirements in the domain of access control systems
by following a customized dynamic software product line
approach. The solution concept is based on a flexible archi-
tecture that uses a central, executable runtime model. The
presented approach can be implemented using GRAF [1].
Up to our knowledge, SPL and DSPL approaches have not
been employed in building dynamic access control systems.
Bertino et al. [9] developed a framework for spatio-temporal
RBAC to adjust access policies based on the users’ identity
and environmental parameters (time, location). Zhang and
Parashar [10] also presented a context-aware access control
mechanism that dynamically adjusts access permissions. In
a recent work, Morin et al. [6] proposed a model-based ap-
proach to adapt access control policies without considering
possible reconfiguration in system features. In contrast to
these related approaches, we include not only a configuration
model at runtime, but also shift a part of the application’s
domain logic to the runtime model layer.
We believe that this architectural decision is beneficial, be-
cause (i) establishing the schema for the runtime model dur-
ing domain engineering supports understanding the domain.
Additionally, (ii) separation of concerns between the vari-
able domain logic (access control model) and the reusable
behavior variations (grant/deny access methods) in source
code artifacts was achieved. Furthermore, (iii) there is no re-
dundancy between the runtime model and code, as the access
control policies are defined as a part of the flexible runtime
model. Most of all, (iv) the model representation supports
to inspect and adapt a part of the product state (feature
configuration, access control policies, state variables) during
operation by executing common querying/transform opera-
tions on the runtime model.
Summing up, our solution approach illustrates how to con-
struct a dynamic software product line of adaptable access
control systems based on (i) a loosely coupled set of arti-
facts including variations for implementing essential domain-
specific operations and (ii) a model-representation of the fea-
ture configuration, domain logic, and state variables which
can be permanently evolved at runtime. Even though our
work is in a preliminary state, applying our previously pub-
lished mechanisms for runtime adaptivity to the access con-
trol domain motivates us to continue our efforts.
In terms of future work, the presented approach needs to
be implemented in a generic way and we plan to analyze if it
is feasible to support product management by using informa-
tion from a runtime model history. Moreover, the modeling
of variation points and variations needs to be refined care-
fully as the related modeling part is based on a pragmatic
solution. Adding and removing new hardware variations at
runtime (as a part of reconfiguration) to implement existing
features needs to be covered as well. Finally, we feel that in-
tegrating the process-related knowledge from traditional SPL
engineering should be more in the focus of research towards
engineering truly dynamic software product lines.
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